Every year over three-quarters of US taxpayers receive income tax refunds, indicating tax prepayments above the level of tax liability. This amounts to a zero interest loan to the government and in some cases may hinder consumption smoothing. Previous studies have suggested two main explanations for this behavior: precautionary behavior in light of tax uncertainty and/or a forced savings motive. I present evidence on a third explanation: inertia. I …nd that tax …lers only partially adjust tax prepayments in response to changes in default withholdings or tax liability. I use four di¤erent settings for identi…cation: (1) a 1992 change in default federal withholding, (2) a panel study of child dependents and tax liability, (3) the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) during the 1990s and (4) a change in default enrollment rules for the Advance EITC option. In the …rst two cases, I …nd that individuals o¤set less than 30% of a shock to the refund level in the …rst year, and less than 60% of this shock after three years. Adjustments in tax prepayments by EITC recipients o¤set no more than 2% of the change in tax liability. In the case of the Advance EITC, I show that informational interventions have the potential to greatly reduce default e¤ects. Given the evidence on inertia, the design of default withholding rules is no longer a neutral decision made by the social planner, but rather, may a¤ect consumption smoothing, particularly for low-income tax …lers.
Introduction
Neoclassical economic theory relies heavily on the assumption that decision makers are fullyoptimizing agents. There is growing evidence, however, that the observed behavior of a substantial share of the population deviates from this assumption in important ways [see Rabin, 1998; DellaVigna, 2008, for overviews] . Recent studies have suggested that departures from fully optimizing behavior may be particularly important in the …eld of public …nance. The welfare calculations underlying the determination of optimal taxes and public good provision hinge on a correct interpretation of observed individual responsiveness to prices and taxes [Bernheim and Rangel, 2008; Chetty et al., 2008] . This paper presents new evidence on "non-standard" behavior in the public …nance domain, based on US income tax withholding patterns. Every year approximately 100 million taxpayers (nearly 80 percent) receive a tax refund because they have overwithheld taxes in the previous year. Overwithholding generates $155 billion in annual income tax refunds-on average 7 percent of adjusted gross income (AGI) [IRS, 2004] . While many overwithholders have relatively high incomes and may view the foregone interest on their tax overpayments as a trivial loss, a surprising fraction of low-income tax …lers have limited (or even zero) tax liability, pay relatively high interest rates to …nance consumption until their refund arrives and in some cases pay additional fees to accelerate the delivery of the refund via refund anticipation loans [Berube et al., 2002; Elliehausen, 2005] .
Previous studies have suggested two main explanations for overwithholding of income taxes: precautionary behavior in light of uncertain tax liability and asymmetric penalties [High…ll et al., 1998 ]; and "forced savings" arising from time-inconsistent preferences and/or mental accounting. [Thaler, 1994; Neumark, 1995; Fennell, 2006] . I explore a third potential explanation based on inertia (or incomplete adjustment). Speci…cally, I consider four situations in which there is a shock to the default level of withholding with no accompanying change in tax liability, or vice versa. I
subsequently observe to what extent tax …lers respond by readjusting withholdings. I begin by exploiting exogenous variation in withholding levels brought about by a Presidential Executive Order. In 1992, President George H. Bush reduced the default level of income tax withholdings for wage earners below a speci…ed income threshold, with the aims of stimulating the economy [Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995] . Importantly, the level of tax liability for this group remained constant. Thus, in the absence of a behavioral response, the policy would result in a reduction in the refund level or increased balance due for treated tax …lers. Using two alternative methods that essentially compare outcomes before and after the policy across "treated" and "untreated groups", I …nd that within the …rst year of this new policy, tax …lers o¤set between 13 and 30 percent of the mandated change in withholdings. In the three years following this policy change, withholding changes by tax …lers have o¤set between 27 and 38 percent of the original shock to the refund level. 1 I then consider the relationship between the number of child dependents and the refund level, using a panel of tax returns from the years 1979 to 1990. In an event study framework, I identify the change in tax liability from the loss or gain of a child. Estimating the subsequent change in tax prepayments yields another test of the inertia hypothesis. I …nd that in terms of a dollar-for-dollar response, prepayments o¤set 11 to 30 percent of the change in tax liability in the …rst year. Three years following the shock, prepayments have adjusted to account for 60 percent of the change in tax liability.
I additionally …nd suggestive evidence of asymmetry in responses when considering the discrete outcome of receiving a refund. The probability of receiving a refund sharply changes after one loses or gains a child dependent. The initial change in the refund probability is similar in magnitude for both cases, but the subsequent reversion to a zero balance appears more pronounced in the case of a child loss. I …nd that the probability of receiving a refund in the current year increases by 40 percentage points in response to a balance due in the previous year that was caused by the loss of a child. In contrast, when a tax …ler gains a child and therefore receives a positive shock towards receiving a refund in a baseline year, there is not a statistically signi…cant change in the following year of the probability of receiving a refund. This asymmetry may generate an upward trend in 1 Feldman [2008] uses this 1992 change in default withholdings as an instrument in identifying the e¤ect of the timing of income on IRA savings. A key identifying assumption is that individuals do not undo the 1992 change in defaults, or rather, that tax …lers are substantially inert. She shows evidence that withholdings are a¤ected by the change in defaults. I complement her …ndings by decomposing this change into a mechanical e¤ect and behavioral response and comparing the relative magnitude of the two. the refund level over time and helps to explain the observed steady state bias towards receiving a refund. Note, however, that the initial default level of withholding is equally as important in generating an overwithholding bias when tax …lers are inert. However, I cannot directly observe this initial phenomenon in the data.
Next, I turn attention to the population eligible for the EITC-a refundable tax credit that directly reduces tax liability [see Hotz and Scholz, 2003, for an overview] . As compared to the average tax …ler, this group of low-income earners might face a signi…cantly higher cost of overwithholding.
Overpayments for this group are on average 13 percent of income, which, in combination with potential borrowing constraints, may hinder the ability to smooth consumption. To test for inertia among these tax …lers, I make use of variation in tax liability generated by the dramatic expansion of the EITC during the 1990s. Using repeated cross sections of tax return data, I estimate the relationship between expected EITC amounts and average tax prepayments. I show that di¤erential growth in EITC levels is a strong predictor of relative refund levels, which suggests that tax prepayments are not adjusted much in response to this particular reduction in tax liability. For every $1 increase the EITC, I can rule out a response greater than $0.02 in reduced tax prepayments.
Thus, there is little evidence of o¤setting behavior on the part of tax …lers in this group.
Finally, I complement this evidence on inertia among EITC recipients with administrative panel data on Advance EITC participation collected during a prior …eld experiment [Jones, Forthcoming] .
The Advance EITC is an option that allows EITC eligible workers to receive a portion of their EITC in every paycheck, as opposed to receiving the entire credit as a "lump sum" at in the end of the tax year. Thus, the decision to make use of this option is equivalent to lowering tax prepayments.
I observe data for a …rm that introduces a new policy requiring employees to renew Advance EITC payments annually. Consistent with the preceding results, I …nd that this shift in default enrollment has signi…cant e¤ects on Advance EITC participation. Ending a policy of automatic, annual renewal permanently reduces take-up by almost 20 percent. The net e¤ect of this shock on tax prepayments is much smaller than in the previous three cases. This is in part due to e¤orts by the employer to limit the e¤ects of the default change. An employer intervention, in the form of targeted notices highlighting the new rules, was implemented prior to the …rst requirement and again following the second one. In comparing the two cases, it appears that (1) in the absence of the informational intervention, the default e¤ects would have been much more pronounced and (2) these informational e¤orts taken by the employer help to o¤set a majority of the default e¤ects.
These …ndings have at least two interrelated implications for research in public …nance and behavioral economics. First, caution must be taken when using the observed levels of income tax refunds to generate inferences about preferences. For example, the prevalence of overwithholding has been cited as evidence of time-inconsistent preferences and/or mental accounting [Neumark, 1995; Thaler, 1994; Fennell, 2006] . In such cases, having a fraction of disposable income tied up in the withholdings system may generally be desirable. However, we may not be able to safely conclude that individuals use overwithholding as a commitment device for forced savings, as the presence of inertia confounds such an interpretation. 2 Thus, more work is needed to disentangle the competing hypotheses on overwithholding. Alternative sources of data and/or possibly …eld experiments might prove more e¤ective in executing such a task.
Second, to the extent that defaults drive the behavior of inert tax payers, the decisions made by a social planner in setting default withholdings may no longer have neutral e¤ects. Similar conclusions have been made in other arenas where default e¤ects have been detected [Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2003; Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006] . Default withholding rules in the US generally predispose individuals toward refunds. In addition, I provide evidence that tax …lers are only partially responsive to shocks to the refund level and less so to upward pressure on refunds than to comparable downward pressures. This combination of factors may result in persistent upward drift in refund levels, as evidenced by the e¤ects of EITC expansion during the 1990s. As such, it may prove bene…cial for the social planner to take a more active role in in ‡uencing refund levels through the design of default withholding mechanisms. This is especially relevant to tax …lers in the lower tail of the income distribution, where sizeable refundable credits and a possibly higher incidence of inertia result in a signi…cant share of income that is overwithheld. This phenomenon may be purposeful, increasing savings for these tax …lers. On the other hand, given the evidence on inertia, it might also be the case that default withholding rules generate ine¢ ciently high amounts of tax prepayments and result in costly constraints on liquidity throughout the year.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the US income tax withholding system. Next, I present an empirical framework for studying inertia in Section 3. I then describe the data used in this study and provide descriptive statistics on overwithholding in Section 4. I present empirical results on inertia in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion.
Institutional Details
In the US, individuals are taxed on income as they receive it, in a so-called "pay-as-you-earn" system. Throughout the year tax …lers make prepayments either through withholdings, which are taken out of each paycheck, or through quarterly, estimated payments to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which typically account for non-wage sources of income. At the end of the year, annual income has been fully realized, and the tax liability is determined. If tax prepayments are too low, the tax …ler must pay the remaining balance, with a possible interest penalty. If prepayments are too high, tax …lers receive a refund, although no interest is earned on the excess tax prepayments.
Given the uncertainty involved, it may prove di¢ cult to exactly equate prepayments to tax liability.
Nevertheless, clear feedback is received every year with the …ling of a tax return, in the form of a refund or balance due. Lower income tax …lers may qualify for refundable credits, which can result in a negative tax liability. In this case, a refund is received even if tax prepayments are zero.
Notwithstanding, refundable credits may be partially shifted from an end-of-the-year payment into each paycheck via the Advance EITC option [Committee on Ways and Means, 2004] .
In a traditional employment setting, the employer automatically withholds tax prepayments for an employee each pay period. Employees determine the withholding amount using a W-4
form [see IRS, 2009b] . Speci…cally, the W-4 form involves choosing a number of allowances, which roughly re ‡ect the anticipated number of exemptions to be claimed on the tax return. The higher the number of allowances, the lower are the withholdings taken from the paycheck. The W-4 form provides guidelines for choosing a number of allowances based on the major factors a¤ecting tax liability: number of dependents, deductions, marital status and number of jobs. In addition to choosing a number of allowances, tax …lers may designate an additional dollar amount to be withheld from each paycheck. Withholdings are then computed by the employer using the employee's W-4 form, the employee's level of earnings and an IRS-provided withholding schedule. A W-4 form can be resubmitted at any time should tax liability be expected to change but is generally only required at the onset of employment. In the event that an employee submits an incomplete W-4 or no W-4, the employer is required to choose zero allowances, resulting in the maximum level of withholdings [IRS, 2009a] . This default rule may help explain why prepayments are initially set high. The evidence I present below on inertia and asymmetric adjustment may help to explain why prepayments tend to remain high overtime.
An Empirical Model of Withholding

General Framework
I will now motivate the empirical analysis with the following simple model of income tax refunds.
Consider the refund level:
where R ( ), P ( ) and L ( ) are the refund, tax prepayment, and tax liability level respectively. There are two endogenous determinants of prepayments and liabilities, A and E. These can be thought of as the number of allowances and earnings. Finally, there is an exogenous policy parameter Z, which may represent some feature of the tax code. Now consider the change in the refund level given a change in the policy parameter Z:
where the …rst two terms on the right-hand side constitute a behavioral response by the tax payer and the third term, the mechanical e¤ect, represents the direct e¤ect of the policy change. I make the following simplifying assumptions, which are relevant to the types of policy changes that I consider:
Assumption 1 Allowances do not a¤ ect tax liability:
Assumption 2 Changes in tax liability and tax prepayments brought about by an earnings response are o¤ setting:
The policy change either only a¤ ects tax prepayments or only a¤ ects tax liability:
The …rst assumption describes the nature of allowances. Adjusting the number of allowances only a¤ects withholdings. The second assumption captures the nature of automatic withholdings. If earnings change, withholdings from the paycheck are automatically adjusted in much the same way as tax liability via tax withholding schedules. The marginal withholding rate is (approximately) the same as the marginal tax rate. 3 The …nal assumption describes a feature of the policy changes under consideration. In each case, either the default withholding level changes with no accompanying change in tax liability, or vice versa. Using these assumptions, the change in refund level in Equation (1) simpli…es to:
when the policy a¤ects default withholdings, or
when the policy a¤ects tax liability. Here again, the changes are decomposed into the behavioral response via tax prepayments, 4P B , and the mechanical e¤ects on prepayments and liabilities, 4P M and 4L M respectively. In measuring the tax …ler's response to the policy change, consider the following two extreme cases:
Case 1 (Full Adjustment) under full adjustment the agent adjusts prepayments to fully o¤ set the policy change:
and thus equations (2) and (3) can be rearranged as follows to de…ne the adjustment rate, , i.e.
the ratio of the behavioral response to the mechanical e¤ ect:
Case 2 (Full Inertia) under full inertia the agent does not o¤ set the policy change at all:
and thus the above adjustment rates become:
In practice, I estimate these adjustment rates by regressing an observed change in tax prepayment level on the expected mechanical change in prepayments or liabilities. Variation in the mechanical change is brought about by some policy change or other shock to the refund level, Z.
Though the details of vary slightly, I generally use some variation of the following speci…cation:
when the policy a¤ects prepayments and
when the policy a¤ects tax liability. The vector X includes a group of control variables. The key identifying assumption is that the policy variable, Z, does not directly a¤ect the underlying target refund level, and thus only a¤ects tax prepayments via a change in default prepayments or tax liability. A model of full adjustment predicts that the coe¢ cient on the mechanical change, ,
should have a value of 1. Alternatively, a model of full inertia predicts = 0.
Speci…c Applications
I use the preceding framework to estimate an adjustment rate, , in four di¤erent settings. In each case, there is a unique shock that a¤ects the expected refund level. I subsequently observe the taxpayer's response to this event. In the Section 5 below, I outline the key features of the di¤erent sources of identi…cation. In two cases, the 1992 change in default withholdings and the Advance EITC case study, there is a change in default withholdings while holding liability constant.
In the other two cases, the panel study of child dependents and the 1990s EITC expansion, tax liability changes without a compensating adjustment of default withholdings. In each case, I use a di¤erent econometric approach. I relate each of these approaches to the general empirical framework described above. I also highlight two other signi…cant di¤erences across the four events: the relative salience of each shock and the direction (up or down) in which the shock sends the refund level in the absence of a behavioral response. 
Descriptive Statistics
In order to provide a brief overview of the overwithholding phenomenon, I provide summary statistics for tax …lers in 2004 in Column (4) of Table 1 . In addition to adjusted gross income (AGI), there are various measures of overwithholding. On average, individuals receive a refund of $1,000
and make prepayments that are 3 times as large as their tax liability. These refunds comprise 7 percent of AGI for the average tax …ler. Finally, the share of tax …lers receiving a refund is just below 80 percent. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts a skewed right distribution of refunds that visually reinforces the summary statistics. One may notice the mass of …lers at a zero balance. This is mainly comprised of individuals with both zero tax liability and zero tax prepayments. 4 Further visual evidence reveals two signi…cant patterns of overwithholding. First, withholding defaults may a¤ect behavior signi…cantly. Panel B of Figure 1 presents an estimated distribution of actual allowances along side a counterfactual distribution of allowance. The former is estimated using wage and withholding data to impute the number of allowances taken on the W-4 form. 5 The latter uses demographic information from the tax return to calculate the total number of allowances to which the individual is actually entitled. As can be seen, individuals claim less than the total number of allowances to which they are entitled and are also clustered at zero allowances, which is the default level set for workers by employers. Second, we see in Panel 
Results
1992 Change in Default Withholdings
In his 1992 State of the Union Address, President George H. Bush announced a decrease in default withholdings aimed at stimulating a sluggish economy [Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995] . New withholdings tables were issued in February of that year and employers were instructed to incorporate the new tables as soon as possible [IRS, 1992] . The typical reduction in annual withholdings was $187 and $423 for single and married wage earners with taxable wages below $64,000 and $110,000
respectively. 6 Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the nature of the change in withholdings. Importantly, there was no concurrent reduction in tax liability. Within the framework presented of Section 3, Z corresponds to the default withholding rules. There is no change in tax liability due to the policy change, @L=@Z = 0, and thus I am estimating the adjustment rate P . The mechanism, A, by which individuals o¤set the policy is submitting a new W-4 with a lower number of allowances to raise withholdings. They may also o¤set the change by increasing estimated payments. For this analysis, I use repeated cross section data from the IRS SOI public use samples. Table 1 , Column
(1) provides descriptive statistics on the sample used. In terms of income and refund propensity, this sample, which represents about half of the entire tax …ler population, falls somewhere between the general population of tax …lers and the EITC speci…c population.
Tax payers are made aware of the 1992 policy change through two main avenues. First, individuals receive a higher after-tax paycheck every pay period once the employer implements the change in withholdings tables. Shapiro and Slemrod [1995] …nd that about one-third of survey respondents noticed a reduction in withholdings a month after the policy took e¤ect. Second, when the tax return is …led, the tax …ler should receive a lower refund or owe a higher balance than is usual.
In addition, employers were instructed to notify their employees of the change in withholdings, and also to instruct them on how to o¤set the reduction in withholdings. The new Employer's Tax and thus is subject to the withholding change. The second group, "non-wage earners," has wage and salary income below this threshold and is therefore not subject to the change in default withholdings.
Non-wage earners may have other sources of income, such as self-employment, interest or dividend income. I refer to the two groups as the "treatment" and "control." The vertical lines in the Figure denote the period over which default withholdings were reduced. We see a noticeable decline in refunds for wage earners during the policy change. The same is not true for non-wage earners. This visual evidence is merely suggestive, however, as the di¤erence in composition of income may be correlated with signi…cant, unobservable di¤erences between the two groups.
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimates
As an initial step toward estimating an adjustment rate, I compare withholdings before and after the policy and also between the "treatment" and "control" tax …lers using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DD) estimator. First, data are grouped into cells based on year and marital status. The cells are further divided into two groups based on wage and salary income. One group has enough wage and salary income to be a¤ected by the change in withholding tables, while the other does not. These cuto¤s are $3,007 and $7,364 for single and married …lers respectively. Those with wages below the cuto¤s might possibly have other sources of income, such as self-employment income or investment income. The data are then split by adjusted gross income (AGI) into intervals of $10,000. Finally, cells of single and married …lers with AGI above $70,000 and $110,000 respectively were dropped, as tax …lers in these groups were generally not subject to the change in withholdings. This procedure resulted in 36 cells per year. All variables were then averaged at the cell level using sample weights.
The net e¤ect of the policy change on prepayments is 4P = (4P M + 4P B ). That is, the total change in prepayments is the sum of the mechanical and behavioral components. I can estimate this net e¤ect using cell averages in the following regression:
where P gt denotes average tax prepayments in the form of either withholdings or estimated payments, g and t are cell and year …xed e¤ects and X gt is a vector of average tax liability and EITC credits. The variable T gt is a treatment indicator that equals 1 if both the cell year is after the policy change and the cell wages are within the eligible range to be a¤ected by the executive order. This regression is run for groups of two years, comparing 1991 outcomes to those in each of the years 1992, 1993, and 1994. I similarly estimate so called "placebo" regressions: the change in withholdings between 1990 and 1991 and the change in estimated payments between 1991 and 1992, both quantities unlikely to be a¤ected by the change in tax policy. Robust standard errors and standard errors clustered at the cell level are calculated. This method does not allow me to separately identify the mechanical and behavioral e¤ects. However, I can approximate P using the following identity:
As stipulated in the executive order, I can plug in a mechanical e¤ect, 4P M , of $187 and $423 for single and married tax …lers respectively.
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimates for the full sample, and separately for single and married …lers. The average decrease in withholdings is $255. The net e¤ect, 4P, for single and married …lers are on the same order of policy change, $157 and $369 respectively. Using the identity in (9), this implies an P of 0.16 and 0.13 respectively. In Columns (2) and (3), I conduct the DD estimate between 1991 and each of the years 1993 and 1994. We see that the e¤ect is still signi…cant three years out, with an implied P of 0.17 and 0.28 for single and married …lers respectively. I also conduct two "placebo" experiments in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 . Column (4) indicates that there are not comparable changes in withholdings between 1990 and 1991. Also, there were no signi…cant changes in estimated payments between 1991 and 1992, which are not e¤ected by the executive order. Thus, it appears that the drop in withholdings is due to the change in defaults in 1992.
Incorporating Information from Withholding Tables
I can go a step further by using information on the relationship between withholdings, wages and allowances to arrive at an alternative measure of P . This alternative method of estimating the mechanical e¤ects, behavioral responses and adjustment rates requires the following three components:
P 0 A i 0 ; E i : baseline withholdings prior to the policy change P 1 A i 0 ; E i : withholdings following the policy change given no change in allowances P 1 A i 1 ; E i : withholdings after the policy change and change in allowances.
where withholdings, P ( ), are a function of allowances, A i , and wage earnings, E i , as described in IRS withholding tables. The 0 and 1 subscripts denote pre-and post-policy variables respectively, for the ith individual in 1992. I observe post-policy withholdings and earnings, and thus can infer the distribution of post-policy allowances. However, I do not observe pre-policy 1992 withholdings and thus cannot make direct inferences regarding pre-policy allowances, A i 0 . Therefore, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 4 In the absence of the policy change, the distribution of allowances would have remained constant between 1991 and 1992:
Using data from 1991, I estimate the distribution of allowances in 1991 and use this as a proxy for the pre-policy distribution of allowances in 1992. I similarly use data from 1992 to estimate the distribution of post-policy allowances in 1992, arriving at estimates of the conditional distributions,
where is a vector containing income group and marital status. Additional details regarding the estimation of these distributions are provided in an appendix. Using these conditional distributions, I estimate withholdings as follows:
For a given individual, then, the mechanical e¤ect and behavioral response are de…ned as follows:
Finally, I use the estimated mechanical e¤ects and behavioral responses in the following regression:
where x is a control variable measuring the level of tax liability. Standard errors for the regressions are clustered within each income-by-marital cell.
Panel C of Figure 2 lends credence to this method. The graph shows the estimated distribution of allowances from 1990 to 1993, using the same methods as in Figure 1 . First, we see that the distribution is relatively stable between 1990 and 1991, suggesting that in the absence of a policy change, the distribution of allowances would have remained constant from 1991 to 1992. We also see that the distribution shifts in 1992 in the direction toward lower allowances and thus higher withholdings, which would be expected of individuals attempting to o¤set the policy change. This is evidence of a behavioral response.
In Table 3 , I estimate the fraction by which this behavioral response o¤sets the mechanical e¤ect of the policy shock. The sample is again restricted to individuals within the range of a¤ected wages. Using Equation (10), I estimate an average mechanical decrease in withholdings of $237, with conditional averages of $180 and $392 for single and married …lers respectively. In contrast, I estimate an average behavioral response of only $60 in additional withholdings using Equation (11). Estimating Equation (12), this translates into an estimate of .30 for P . Tax …lers only o¤set 30 percent of the decrease in withholdings during the …rst year of the policy change.
Panel Study of Child Dependents
I further explore inertia by estimating the e¤ect of child dependents on tax liability and tax prepayments. Adding a child increases the number of exemptions that a taxpayer can claim, reducing taxable income. In addition, tax credits such as the EITC become available for households within certain income ranges. Thus, when one either loses or gains a child dependent, tax liability will rise or fall in a predictable manner. Returning to the general empirical framework, the so-called policy variable, Z, is now number of children dependents. Again, there is a change in tax liability via the number of exemptions claimed, but automatic withholding from wages does not adjust unless a new W-4 form is …led. I will use Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to isolate this variation that is driven by a change in dependents. Here we have a case where @P=@Z = 0, L = 1 under full adjustment and L = 0 under full inertia.
To examine this phenomenon I use panel data on tax returns spanning 1979 to 1990. I perform an event study of the loss or gain of a child dependent. Following a change in the number of child dependents, tax …lers receive direct feedback on the change in tax liability when the tax return is …led. The loss or gain of a child will result in a lower or higher refund level, respectively. In addition, if a new W-4 form is …led for any reason, the tax payer is explicitly directed to take into account any changes in the number of children that are claimed [IRS, 2009b] . Within this context, I can directly compare the e¤ect of being pushed toward a refund or toward owing a balance on subsequent prepayments and refund probabilities. The former case is associated with the gain of a dependent, while the latter is associated with the loss of a dependent.
In Column (2) of Table 1 , we see that compared to the other cases that I consider, this sample is the most representative of entire tax …ling population. The data are essentially trimmed of the top 1 percent of incomes, for whom information on children is obscured for con…dentiality purposes. While 84% of the changes in child dependents from year to year involve one child, I pool all changes, which may include two or more dependents lost or gained. Losses and gains are equally likely to occur in the sample. Nonetheless, losses and gains of children are not directly comparable events. The former tends to happen later in the life cycle, while the latter tends to happen earlier.
Furthermore, the loss of a child may be commonly preceded by a divorce or downward shock to income. In the analysis that follows I include income and marital status as control variables.
Continuous Adjustment Rate
I will estimate the adjustment rates along two margins: a continuous response and a discrete response. I de…ne the continuous adjustment as the level change in tax prepayments relative to a level change in tax liability, or, a dollar-for-dollar adjustment. I de…ne the discrete adjustment as the change in the probability of receiving a refund in the current period in response to a change in the probability of owing a balance due in a prior period. I …rst estimate the adjustment rate along the continuous margin from the following structural equation using 2SLS:
The …rst stage and reduced form regressions are as follows:
where i , s and t are individual, state and time …xed e¤ects. The vector X it includes a cubic in AGI, marital status and an indicator for age above 65 years. The Loss=Gain i;t k are a set of dummy variables indicating that at time t a change in dependents has taken place k periods in the past, or in the future for k < 0. Parameters are estimated separately for losses and gains of dependents.
The coe¢ cients 4L k M and 4P k B in equations (14) and (15) In all the graphs that follow in this section, the x-axis will measure time and the y-axis will measure outcomes relative to the year in which the number of child dependents changes. In Figure   3 , I plot the coe¢ cients from Equation (14). Though liability is generally declining as the event nears, there is a sharp increase in tax liability when a dependent is lost. The inverse is true for gains in dependents. We also observe that the estimates become increasingly noisy as time passes.
Thus, I focus on windows of three years after the event when reporting point estimates. Figure   3 also plots the associated dynamics of tax prepayments, estimated using Equation (15). Though there appears to be some response to the change in tax liability, the di¤erences in prepayments following a change in dependents are far less pronounced. The net e¤ect on refund levels is plotted in Figure 4 , where we see that the refund level initially drifts in the same direction as the shock.
In Table 4 , I report the point estimates underlying these …gures. As can be seen in Columns
(1) and (4) of Table 4 , a change in the number of dependent translates into an immediate change in tax liability of about $470 dollars. This change in tax liability persists over the next three years.
In Columns (2) and (5) of Table 4 , we see that the response of tax prepayments is not as large:
$76 and $138 for a loss or gain of a dependent respectively. This adjustment gradually increases over time, with a possibly smaller response accompanying the loss of a dependent in the …rst year.
Finally, I estimate cont L , the dollar-for-dollar adjustment rate of tax prepayments to tax liabilities, as speci…ed in Equation (13). The response in the three years following a change in dependents is reported in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 4 . We see that in the …rst year following the change in tax liability the adjustment rate is between 11 and 30 percent. Tax prepayments do not fully adjust; three years after the change in dependents, only 60 percent of the shock has been undone.
The adjustment rate appears to be similar for losses and gains of dependents. This would suggest that shocks leading to lower and higher refund levels have similar e¤ects on taxpayers. However, there is an alternative way of measuring the response that focuses on discrete adjustment, i.e.
whether a tax …ler receives a refund or owes a balance. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the refund probability following a change in dependents. A loss of a dependent reduces the refund probability and a gain increases the probability at a similar magnitude, between 7 and 8 percent, in the …rst year following the change. However, it appears that the change in refund probability reverts to zero at a faster rate for those who have lost a dependent.
Discrete Adjustment Rate
Individuals may be more responsive to discrete outcomes: i.e. whether or not they receive a refund.
Following the loss of a dependent, an unexpected balance due may cause a tax …ler to take extra measures to avoid owing the next time taxes are …led. Likewise, an unexpected refund caused by a gain in dependents may compel the tax …ler to adjust back toward a balance due in the following year. Thus, I use the following, slightly di¤erent, 2SLS model:
with the accompanying …rst stage and reduced form regressions:
where ref und ist is an indicator variable for receiving a refund and owe is;t j is an indicator variable for having owed a balance j periods ago for individual i in state s at time t. The other control variables remain the same as in Equations (13) to (15). The parameter 4O k M may now be regarded as the mechanical e¤ect of experiencing a change in child dependents k periods ago on the probability of owing a balance due j periods ago. Likewise, the parameter 4R k B now measures the behavioral response in terms of the change in the probability of receiving a refund in period t given a change in dependents happened k periods ago. It follows that the coe¢ cient disc L measures the discrete response of the refund probability in period t to the lagged realization of owing a balance due j periods ago. For these regressions, if the number of child dependents changed in period t k, then
The 2SLS method used to obtain the discrete margin response relies on a very particular type of variation in the probability of owing. Since there is an individual …xed e¤ect, I am comparing changes within tax …lers over time. In addition, if the e¤ect of a change in dependents is monotonic, then I am estimating a local average treatment e¤ect [Imbens and Angrist, 1994] . I am identifying the response of those individuals who would not have otherwise undergone a change in refund/balance due status had their not been a change in the number of dependents k periods ago: the so-called "compliers." In other words, I am identi…ed o¤ of downward shocks that drive a refund below zero into a balance due or upward shocks that generate a transition from a balance due to a refund received. Table 5 presents estimates of the e¤ect of having a balance due in a lagged period on subsequent refund probabilities. The precision of these estimates decreases greatly when examining lags of 2 or more years and the strength of the instruments decreases with the length of the lag, as evidenced by the …rst stage F-statistic. Therefore, I focus on a one year lag and …nd that the response appears to be larger for those who lose a dependent. The estimates suggest that for those who lost a dependent two years prior, the probability of receiving a refund in the current period increases by 40 percentage points in response to a balance due in the previous year, which implies an disc L of 0.4. On the other hand, an exogenous refund in the previous period does not produce a statistically signi…cant response for gainers.
What explains the discrepancy between the discrete and continuous outcomes? Perhaps a reduction in the refund level is more salient when it results in a transition from receiving a refund to owing a balance. In contrast, when examining a dollar-for-dollar response, I include many tax …lers who experience a loss in dependents and increase in tax liability, but nevertheless receive a refund.
Many in this group are simply located far enough from a zero balance that a reduction in dependents will not bring them across the refund/balance due threshold. The 2SLS approach that focuses on the discrete response e¤ectively narrows the analysis to those marginal individuals receiving a refund close enough to a zero balance. Thus, the response of individuals in this narrowly de…ned group may be qualitatively di¤erent than the general population of tax …lers: they experience a change in refund level and also a possibly more salient transition in refund/balance due status. In terms of the general framework for inertia, the policy variable, Z, is now the level of the EITC for eligible tax …lers. In this case, there is a change in tax liability but no accompanying change in withholding defaults: @P=@Z = 0. Under full adjustment, the predicted adjustment rate is L = 1, while under full inertia L = 0. Finally, the mechanism, A, for o¤setting the policy is again the lowering of withholdings through the W-4 form or the lowering of estimated payments. Individuals may also sign up for Advance EITC payments in order to o¤set the change in tax liability. I discuss this option in the next section.
1990s EITC Expansion
In terms of salience, the frequency of feedback provided by the EITC is generally at the annual level. Over time, eligible households are presented with larger and larger refunds. Further signals of EITC expansion may result from the marketing and outreach e¤orts of tax preparers, both free and commercial, who encourage eligible households to …le a tax return and claim the EITC.
An understanding of the connection between the EITC and tax liability, however, may be more elusive for EITC recipients. For example, EITC recipients generally do not bunch at kink points in the EITC schedule [Saez, 2002] . As compared to the other cases under consideration, the EITC expansion drives eligible tax …lers toward receiving a larger refund in the absence of any behavioral response.
To estimate the e¤ect of the EITC on prepayments, I make use of repeated cross sections of tax return data from the 1990s. First, I restrict the analysis to tax …lers with non-zero prepayments.
This avoids a bias toward inertia that would stem from including individuals who have no means of further lowering prepayments. I group observations annually into four categories. The …rst group is ineligible for the EITC. The next three groups are EITC-eligible tax …lers with zero, one or two or more children. In order to account for changes in group composition that occur due to changes in EITC eligibility, income variables are adjusted to 2000 levels and EITC eligibility is based on year 2000 criteria. Eligibility is determined using the tax …ler information and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Internet TAXSIM model. 7 Next, I calculate group-by-year averages and conduct the following regressions:
where g indexes the four groups, t is a year index, the 's are group and year …xed e¤ects and X gt is a vector of average observable controls including a cubic in income, tax liability, and other refundable credits. The outcome, P gt , measures average tax prepayments for group g in year t.
Finally, there is a negative sign in front of L since @liability=@EIT C = 1.
As shown in Column (3) of Table 1 , members of this group represent about a quarter of the entire tax …ling population and occupy a lower segment of the income distribution than the tax …lers in the previous two cases. As such, the costs of overwithholding may be the greatest for this group. It is surprising, then, that these tax …lers are particularly prone to overwithholding. We see in Table 1 that they make tax prepayments that are on average more than 8 times as much as they owe. This ties up an average of 13 percent of income in overwithholdings throughout the year. As I will show, this high propensity to overwithhold is in part due to the interaction of growing tax credits and high levels of inertia.
As demonstrated in the Panel A of Figure 5 , the credit underwent signi…cant expansions during the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially for families with 2 or more children. I use this variation in tax liability to test for inertia in prepayments. Panel B of Figure 5 illustrates a strong positive correlation between EITC levels and refund levels across the groups and over time. This visual evidence suggests that there was little to no adjustment of tax prepayments in response to increases in EITC levels. In Panel C of Figure 5 , I have plotted tax prepayments over the same time period.
Tax prepayments do not appear to decline in response to the EITC increases. During the 1990s, when the EITC underwent its most pronounced growth, the level of tax prepayments among eligible tax …lers is relatively ‡at, with the exception of two events. In 1992 there are sharp declines in prepayments, which, as has been shown, is due to a 1992 Executive Order. In 2002, there are reductions in tax prepayments that are most likely due to across the board tax cuts rather than EITC growth. Finally, to the extent that there is a decreasing trend in tax prepayments, it is nearly identical for both eligible and non-eligible tax …lers. This underscores the notion that changes in tax prepayments over this period were not in response to EITC growth. 
Change in Enrollment Defaults for the Advance EITC
I extend the analysis of inertia among EITC recipients with a case study of the Advance EITC.
The Advance EITC is an option that allows EITC eligible workers to receive a portion of their refundable credit earlier in each paycheck, as opposed to a one time payment at the end of the tax year. In e¤ect, this option gives tax …lers another method by which withholdings may be reduced and even allows for withholdings to be reduced below zero. The program requires employees to …ll out a W-5 form indicating that they expect to receive the EITC. Though this option has been available since 1979, participation in the program is very low. It is estimated that between 0.5 and 3 percent of eligible workers make use of the Advance EITC [Jones, Forthcoming] . One distinctive feature of this program is that individuals must renew Advance EITC payments every year. Here, the policy variable, Z, is Advance EITC participation, which automatically ends at the renewal date if no action is taken. In this case, tax prepayments are a¤ected, but tax liability does not change for tax …lers: @L=@Z = 0. We expect p = 1 under the case of full adjustment and P = 0 under full inertia. The primary method by which individuals o¤set the policy, A, is to re-enroll in the Advance option. Alternatively, individuals may lower withholdings through allowances or lower estimated payments.
I will present evidence from data collected by Jones [Forthcoming] in the context of a …eld experiment. The data track Advance EITC enrollment within a large …rm that introduces the annual renewal requirement to employees. This feature, mandated by law, requires the Advance recipient to renew payments at the beginning of every calendar year. The participating …rm had previously followed a policy of automatic renewal, but then switched to an active renewal requirement in order to comply with IRS tax code. The data cover the …rst two renewal dates introduced by the …rm. Prior to the …rst date, all Advance EITC recipients within the …rm were made aware of the upcoming change. The same was not done at the second date. However, following the second deadline, e¤orts were taken by the …rm to re-enroll individuals who had been removed. The notices separate tax …lers in this sample from the previous three cases, in that the salience of the change in default withholdings is far greater. The mechanical e¤ect of the policy is a reduction in Advance payments to zero and the behavioral response is measured by the re-enrollment of employees into the Advance program. Comparing Advance payments before and after the deadlines will yield an estimate of the adjustment rate, p . Figure 6 displays the e¤ects of the deadline on participation, as well as the countervailing e¤ect of the company's noti…cation e¤orts. The vertical lines denote the …rst and second renewal dates.
Because the company only realized its need to comply well into the year 2007, the …rst date is not introduced on the typical date of January 1st. Subsequent renewal dates are enforced annually at the beginning of January. This allows the default e¤ect to be identi…ed separately from any general end of the year e¤ects on enrollment.
As can be seen in Figure 6 , the introduction of a renewal requirement reduces Advance EITC enrollment by more than 25 percent at the …rst renewal date. The drop in enrollment at the …rst date is not as steep as that of the second renewal date, which implies that the informational notice helped mitigate the e¤ect of the renewal requirement. At the second renewal date, when no prior notice is provided, enrollment temporary reaches zero and then begins to sharply rebound, following e¤orts by the …rm to re-enroll employees. Although in both cases enrollment recovers signi…cantly, the change in defaults appears to have permanently reduced long run enrollment. Table 7 reports the adjustment rate, P , associated with the change in enrollment at the deadline. As can be seen both graphically and from the Table, the employees are much more e¤ective in o¤setting the shock to withholdings than in the three previous settings. Just months after each renewal requirement, the rebound in enrollment implies an P of 0.82 and 0.75 respectively for the …rst and second dates. This is true whether one considers enrollment or weekly Advance EITC payments as the margin of adjustment.
Discussion and Conclusion
I observe estimates of an adjustment rate in the …rst year following a shock range from essentially 0 in the case of the EITC to about 0.42 for the discrete response to the loss of a child dependent.
The case of Advance EITC enrollment defaults stands out as an exceptional case in which tax …lers exhibited a much greater response, o¤setting more than 75 percent of the default e¤ect.
In that instance, the employer took signi…cant e¤ort to preempt the default e¤ects. This case notwithstanding, I …nd that the responses of tax …lers are generally signi…cantly di¤erent from a model of full adjustment.
The e¤ect of these shocks on the refund level appears to persist for some time. In the case of the 1992 change in default withholdings, the e¤ect of new withholdings tables appear to remain even after three years. The ratio of the net drop in withholdings and the initial decrease intended by the policy change imply an adjustment rate between 0.27 and 0.38 after three years. Further evidence is drawn from the panel study of child dependents and tax liability. In Table 4 we see that 3 years after a change in the number of dependents, tax …lers appear to adjust prepayments by only about 60 percent of the change in liability.
I additionally …nd that the tax …ler response may be asymmetric with respect to the direction of the shock to refund levels. Tax …lers appear more apt to o¤set downward pressures on the refund level than equivalent upward pressures. I o¤er two pieces of evidence in support of this. First, there appears to be a stronger response to the change in tax liability brought about by the loss of a dependent than by the gain of a dependent. This is only apparent, however, when considering the discrete response to a change in the number of child dependents, which is presented in Table   5 . In this case, the point estimates of the adjustment rate in response to downward pressures on the tax refund level dominate the estimated response to shocks in the opposite direction. However, the estimates are within sampling error of each other. Nevertheless, the evidence is suggestive of an asymmetry in adjustment rates.
As compared to the discrete response, reactions to a change in the number of dependents along a continuous margin appear to be roughly symmetric. This is evident in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 4 . Thus, individuals appear to be fairly indi¤erent to nudges in their refund level, even particularly large ones, such as the growth in EITC levels, regardless of the direction of the drift.
However, if the nudge causes them to transition from receiving a refund to owing a balance, action is more likely to be taken to undo the shock to the refund level.
Further evidence of asymmetry may be extrapolated from comparing inertia in the case of the 1992 change in default withholdings to that in the context of EITC expansions. In the former case, the refund level is driven down following the shock, while in the latter, the refund increases. The adjustment rate estimated in the case of the 1992 change in default withholdings is larger than the estimates that are generated by examining the response of tax prepayments to EITC growth. This is additional evidence that suggests that downward shocks to the refund level result in stronger responses on the part of tax …lers. The di¤erences in inertia between these two cases mentioned here, however, might also be due to di¤erences in the makeup of the samples. This brings us to our next …nding.
As compared to the …rst two inquiries that make use of more representative samples, the study of withholdings among EITC-eligible workers generates by far the strongest evidence of inertia.
These tax …lers appear to be fully inert in their adjustment of tax prepayments when faced with dramatic EITC growth. This is made clear in Table 6 . In Column (4) of this Table, I can rule out an adjustment rate greater than .02. This result is intriguing given the fact that the costs of overwithholding are likely to be the greatest among tax …lers concentrated in the lower end of the income distribution, where liquidity constraints may potentially bind. There are many possible explanations. First, in the event that responses are asymmetric, we might expect more inertia in the case of the EITC, which increases refund levels. Alternatively, EITC recipients may be less sophisticated with respect to the income tax system than the average tax …ler. Finally, EITC recipients may face greater uncertainty in income and thus are more apt to overwithhold as a precautionary measure.
Further evidence of inertia among EITC-eligible …lers can be found in the context of the Advance EITC. Figure 6 illustrates the e¤ect of a newly instituted renewal deadline on Advance EITC enrollment. I focus …rst on the second deadline in January of 2008. In this case, there were no reminders given to participants prior to the deadline. We see that the immediate e¤ect is almost full reduction in enrollment, indicating a short-run adjustment rate of 0. However, enrollment sharply rebounds, in part due to e¤orts by the employer to re-enroll employees. Additional evidence on the informational e¤ect is apparent when comparing the …rst and second deadlines. In the …rst instance, advance notice of the deadline was given to participating employees. As compared to the second deadline, the initial drop in enrollment at the …rst deadline is much less steep. Thus, it would appear that EITC recipients are highly susceptible to default changes in withholdings but are also very responsive to interventions aimed at mitigating these default e¤ects.
These four separate examples of inertia, along with additional evidence of asymmetry, may help explain the prevalence of overwithholding. In addition to whatever the e¤ect may be of initial default withholdings, individuals over time do not fully adjust to o¤set shocks to the refund level.
Furthermore, when they do respond, they may be more likely to counter downward pressures on refunds, thus increasing the steady state probability of receiving a refund. These results do not, however, provide any guidance as to what the relative contribution is of this dynamic inertia vis-à-vis inertia with respect to baseline withholdings levels. Additional data that includes information on employment tenure is likely needed to help disentangle these two factors. Nevertheless, it would appear that the dynamic inertia plays an important role, especially in the case of the EITC population.
Overall, these …ndings on inertia have at least two interrelated implications for research in public …nance and behavioral economics. First, caution must be taken with drawing inferences about preferences from the observed levels of income tax refunds. For example, the prevalence of overwithholding has been cited as evidence in support of time-inconsistent preferences and/or mental accounting [Neumark, 1995; Thaler, 1994; Fennell, 2006] . In such cases, having a fraction of disposable income tied up in the withholdings system may generally be desirable. However, we may not be able to safely conclude that individuals use overwithholding as a commitment device for forced savings, as the presence of inertia confounds such an interpretation. Thus, more work is yet to be done on disentangling the competing hypotheses on overwithholding. Alternative sources of data and/or possibly …eld experiments might prove more e¤ective in executing such a task.
Second, to the extent that inertia drives behavior, a social planner setting default withholdings might want to think di¤erently about the overwithholding phenomenon. Default withholding rules generally predispose individuals toward refunds. In addition, I provide evidence that tax …lers are only partially responsive to shocks to the refund level, and less so to upward pressure on refunds than to comparable downward pressures. This combination of factors may result in persistent upward drift in refund levels, as evidenced by the e¤ects of EITC expansion during the 1990s.
Given this type of inertia, it may be bene…cial for the social planner to take a more active role in in ‡uencing refund levels through the design of default withholding mechanisms. This is especially relevant to tax …lers in the lower tail of the income distribution, where sizeable refundable credits and a possibly higher incidence of inertia result in a signi…cant share of income that is overwithheld.
Such a phenomenon may be purposeful, increasing savings for these tax …lers. However, given the evidence on inertia, it might also be the case that default withholdings rules generate ine¢ ciently high amounts of prepayments and result in costly constraints on liquidity throughout the year.
Indeed, the status quo of a refund-biased withholding system is by no means a universal phenomenon. Consider the Working Tax Credit (WTC), the UK analog of the EITC. The WTC, similarly a tax credit for low-income workers, is disbursed on a weekly or monthly basis, and thus its timing is more similar to the Advance EITC in the US [Brewer et al., 2008 ]. An interesting question, then, is why and how have the UK and US systems come to be so di¤erent in the timing of refundable credits? Furthermore, do UK taxpayers share the same a¢ nity for large income tax refund payments? In the presence of strong preferences for large refunds, we would expect to observe many UK workers demanding a lump sum payment in lieu of the more frequent WTC. However, we
do not observe such behavior in the UK context [Brewer et al., 2008] . Thus, identifying preferences over large refunds and determining the optimal setting of withholding defaults remains an open debate. In light of the …ndings presented in this study, future inquiry into subject must account for the presence of inertia. 1991 vs. 1992 1991 vs. 1993 1991 vs. 1994 1990 vs. 1991 1991 vs. 1992 Full Note: Mechanical e¤ects, behavioral responses and adjustment rates are estimated using Equations (10), (11) and (12). Data are from 1992 IRS SOI public use …les. The sample is restricted to tax …lers with more than 95% of income originating from wages or salary and with incomes within the a¤ected range of the policy change in withholdings. Standard errors, clustered at the income group level are reported in braces, while bootstrap standard errors are reported in brackets. Dollar amounts are reported in year 2000 levels. (14) and (15). Estimates of the continuous adjustment rate are obtained using Equation (13). Data are from a panel of US tax …lers from the years [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Controls include a cubic in AGI, an indicator of age above 65 years, marital status, and year, state and individual …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Dollar amounts are reported in year 2000 levels. Note: Regressions estimating the a¤ect of the lagged probability of owing a balance on the current probability of receiving a refund are estimated using Equations (16) Note: Rregressions estimating the e¤ect of the EITC on prepayments are estimated using data for US tax …lers from the years 1990-2004. Tax …lers are aggregated by year into four groups depending on EITC eligibility and further by number of children for EITC-eligible tax …lers. Controls include a cubic in AGI, level of child tax credit and tax liability. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One, two and three stars denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Note: The mechanical e¤ect, behavioral response and adjustment rate are estimated with data from an administrative panel used in [Jones, Forthcoming] .
7 Appendix: Additional Details on Empirical Methodology
Estimating the Distribution of Allowances
The distribution of allowancesF 0 A i 0 andF 1 A i 1 are estimated as follows. The data for tax …lers from 1991 and 1992 are restricted to individuals who claimed a standard deduction, with wage and salary income comprising more than 95% of AGI and income below $70,000 and $110,000 for single and married …lers respectively. This eliminates other sources of income that may confound the relationship between wages and withholdings and reduces the sample to those who were a¤ected by the policy change. Next, for a given level of wages, a level of withholdings for each number of allowances was computed using IRS Publication 15, Circular E: Employer's Tax Guide for the given year. The number of allowances that generate the closest match to actual withholdings is assigned to the tax …ler. Essentially, I invert the P ( ) withholding functions. The discrete distribution of these estimated allowances are then calculated for each year-by-income group, separately for married and single tax …lers, where the income groups are de…ned by AGI intervals of $10,000.
Under Assumption (4), I arrive at estimates of the conditional distributions,F 0 A i 0 X i and F 1 A i 1 X i , where X i is a vector containing income group and marital status.
